Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court by Brennan, Thomas et al.
BES IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009 4:01:11 PM 
 
 
Articles 
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND JUDICIAL 
OUTCOMES: 
A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT 
THOMAS BRENNAN† 
LEE EPSTEIN†† 
NANCY STAUDT††† 
ABSTRACT 
  We investigate the effect of economic conditions on the voting 
behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. We theorize that Justices are 
akin to voters in political elections; specifically, we posit that the 
Justices will view short-term and relatively minor economic 
downturns—recessions—as attributable to the failures of elected 
officials, but will consider long-term and extreme economic 
contractions—depressions—as the result of exogenous shocks largely 
beyond the control of the government. Accordingly, we predict two 
patterns of behavior in economic-related cases that come before the 
Court: (1) in typical times, when the economy cycles through both 
recessionary and prosperous periods, the Justices will punish the 
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elected branches of government when the economy contracts by 
voting less frequently for the government; and (2) in atypical times, 
when the economy moves into a period of deep depression, the 
Justices will work with the other branches of government by voting 
more frequently for the government. We test our hypotheses through 
statistical analysis of taxation opinions rendered by the Supreme 
Court during the period from 1913 to 1929 (a relatively normal 
period) and the period from 1930 to 1940 (the Great Depression). We 
find broad support for our hypothesis in the data we analyze, and we 
verify that our results are robust to a change in the measure of the 
economic condition as well as to a change in the specification of the 
regression model. We conclude that U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
exhibit voting patterns similar to voters in political elections when it 
comes to the economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars, commentators, and journalists have long noted the 
tight interconnection between politics and economics. Whereas 
elected officials almost universally pursue the goals of national 
economic growth and stability, specific policies and programs tend to 
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diverge depending on political preferences.1 Voters, in turn, rely on 
economic outcomes as signals of policymaking competence, and 
consequently reward (or punish) incumbent politicians and parties for 
the market conditions that emerge. Voters often perceive a declining 
national economy as evidence of policymaking failure on the part of 
the president and members of Congress and thus seek to discipline 
them by casting votes for their opponents in the election cycle. 
Prosperous conditions, by contrast, imply effective economic 
management and generally increase the vote share of incumbent 
parties.2 So important are economic indicators to the electorate that 
more than a few forecasters have suggested that variables such as 
GDP, job creation, and consumer satisfaction are just as salient—and 
perhaps more so—than the other factors traditionally believed to 
predict election outcomes.3 
This link between economics and politics is an empirical reality 
that scholars have documented in a wide range of contexts: the 
strongest connection emerges in presidential elections, but the link 
also surfaces at notable and significant levels in House, Senate, and 
gubernatorial races.4 Indeed, whereas commentators debate a number 
 
 1. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA, NOURIEL ROUBINI & GERALD D. COHEN, POLITICAL 
CYCLES AND THE MACROECONOMY 47 (1997) (noting that conservative and liberal politicians 
tend to pursue divergent policies with respect to unemployment and inflation). 
 2. See, e.g., RAYMOND M. DUCH & RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, THE ECONOMIC VOTE: 
HOW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS CONDITION ELECTION RESULTS 212 (2008); 
Allan Drazen, The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, in NBER MACROECONOMICS 
ANNUAL 2000, at 75, 83 (Ben S. Bernanke & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2000) (noting that a 
consensus has emerged that aggregate economic conditions before an election, specifically per 
capita output or income growth, have a significant effect on voting patterns in the United 
States); see also Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & William R. Keech, A New View of Political 
Accountability for Economic Performance, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 10, 10–22 (1985) (presenting a 
model of economically sophisticated voters as well as empirical evidence that such a model 
performs well in explaining voter behavior); Ray C. Fair, The Effect of Economic Events on 
Votes for President, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 171 (1978) (concluding that real economic 
activity in the year of an election has an important effect on votes for president); D. Roderick 
Kiewiet, Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 448, 
449 (1981) (finding that unemployment concerns are likely to shift a voter toward the 
Democratic party). But see Francisco Arcelus & Allan H. Meltzer, The Effect of Aggregate 
Economic Variables on Congressional Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1232, 1238 (1975) 
(concluding that aggregate economic variables, with the possible exception of inflation, do not 
affect the participation rate or relative party strength in the case of congressional elections). 
 3. See, e.g., Symposium, Forecasting the 2008 National Elections, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
679 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK & TOM W. RICE, FORECASTING ELECTIONS 30–33, 
64–68, 86, 105–08, 121 (1992) (investigating presidential, House, Senate, and gubernatorial 
elections in the United States and presidential and National Assembly elections in France). 
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of issues—such as whether individual voting is retrospective or 
prospective and which economic factors have the greatest effect on 
election outcomes5—none seem to quarrel with the idea that the 
macroeconomic factors work as a proxy for policymaking competence 
and, for this reason, trend with voting patterns. 
In this Essay, we investigate whether economic conditions affect 
perceptions of policymaking competence—and thus voting 
behavior—in an altogether different context: the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Specifically, we seek to determine whether the Justices look to 
the economy for purposes of assessing government policy and then 
use this information in casting votes for, or against, the government’s 
position in the cases and controversies that appear on their docket. 
Quite a few scholars have theorized how and why the Justices—as 
lawyers, political appointees, and members of the highest unelected 
branch of government—prioritize legal, political, and institutional 
factors in their decisionmaking process, but few have considered 
whether Court members take it upon themselves to monitor national 
economic conditions and then rely on these conditions in the judicial 
context.6 In fact, one might ask whether, as a positive matter, the 
Justices have (or believe themselves to have) the requisite 
information and expertise to render an opinion on the success or 
failure of these often complex policies and programs in their own 
decisionmaking process. And even if such expertise were present on 
the bench, one might ask what the Justices gain by inserting 
themselves into national economic debates. 
To answer these questions we posit a theory of judicial 
decisionmaking that incorporates three simple claims. Specifically, we 
argue that Justices are akin to voters in that they (1) prefer a 
prosperous economy to one that is deteriorating, (2) assess the 
government’s economic management skills by observing changes in 
the economy, and (3) cast votes in a manner that seeks to ensure that 
policymakers pursue the best and most effective programs for 
promoting national growth and productivity. In setting forth our new 
macrotheory of the Court, we do not mean to suggest that the Justices 
prioritize matters economic over legal, political, and institutional 
 
 5. See, e.g., DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 8–16 (discussing various theories of 
economic voting). 
 6. Robert Erikson, Michael Mackuen, and James Stimson indirectly investigate the effects 
of the economy on judicial decisionmaking in their book, ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. 
MACKUEN & JAMES A. STIMSON, THE MACRO POLITY 311–16 (2002) (investigating the effect 
of public opinion on Supreme Court Justices via “mood measure”). 
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concerns; rather, we mean only to suggest that national economic 
conditions are relevant to the judicial decisionmaking process in a 
manner never before explored in the literature. 
How the Justices choose to use economic factors, if they in fact 
do, is ultimately an empirical question, but we theorize that, like 
voters generally, members of the Court adopt two discrete patterns of 
voting when it comes to the economy. During typical business 
cycles—characterized by the repeated sequence of recessions, giving 
way to periods of prosperity, which are then followed again by 
recessions—we expect the Justices to follow the lead of the general 
electorate by punishing and rewarding Congress and the executive for 
the economic conditions that emerge.7 In atypical times—those that 
are associated with massive economic downturns and widespread 
financial harm—we expect the Court will refrain from second-
guessing the policy decisions of the elected branches and, in fact, will 
seek to support the national government in its attempt to stabilize the 
economy—much as citizens (and judges) rally around the flag in the 
face of foreign threats and national emergencies.8 In sum, we theorize 
that the Justices will act like voters: they will view short-term and 
relatively minor economic downturns—recessions—as attributable to 
the failures of elected officials, but will view the long-term and 
extreme economic contractions—depressions—as the result of 
exogenous shocks largely beyond the control of the government and, 
consequently, a time for team work and not finger pointing. 
We test our macrotheory of judicial decisionmaking in the 
context of taxation opinions rendered by the Supreme Court during 
two continuous but discrete periods, from 1912 to 1929 and from 1930 
 
 7. Macroeconomists spend quite a bit of time studying the business cycle in part because 
the ups and downs in the economy are recurrent and expected but also because there is always a 
possibility of a severe and prolonged economic downturn that could lead to widespread harm. 
For an excellent discussion of the business cycle, see ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE & 
DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 282–85 (6th ed. 2008). 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRODY, ASSESSING THE PRESIDENT: THE MEDIA, ELITE 
OPINION, AND PUBLISC SUPPORT 45–78 (1991); JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 208–13 (1973); Richard A. Brody, International Crises: A Rallying Point for the 
President?, PUB. OPINION, Dec.–Jan. 1984, at 41, 41–43, 60; Samuel Kernell, Explaining 
Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in 
Measuring One’s Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the 
Path of Anomalies, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 506, 509–10, 512–13, 518–19 (1978); John E. Mueller, 
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18, 18–34 (1970); Lee 
Sigelman & Pamela Johnston Conover, The Dynamics of Presidential Support During 
International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis, 3 POL. BEHAV. 303, 303 (1981). 
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to 1940.9 The first period, which includes five relatively minor 
business cycles,10 enables us to investigate whether the typical 
business cycle has any effect on judicial decisionmaking. The second 
period, which is often labeled the Great Depression,11 allows us to 
explore the possible effects of a severe economic crisis on Court 
outcomes. Although our findings are preliminary, we find support for 
both components of our theory. In the years before 1930, our data 
indicate the Justices were willing to punish the federal government 
for economic declines as evidenced by a corresponding decrease in 
the government’s win rate. During the 1930s, however, we find that 
the government fared better in the Court—the government’s win rate 
actually increased as the economy continued to tank. Taken 
collectively, these findings enhance our understanding of judicial 
behavior in several ways. Primarily, they provide some evidence that 
the Justices believe they have a role to play in assuring national 
economic prosperity and growth. But the findings also challenge the 
conventional belief that the Court maintained a strong and 
unambiguous bias against President Roosevelt’s administration prior 
to the announcement of the Court-packing plan (we find the opposite 
is true in the context of taxation).12 In addition, the findings may help 
explain Supreme Court votes in the post–World War II era and, at 
the same time, forecast upcoming votes in the context of the serious 
national economic decline that began in 2008.13 
Our study unfolds as follows. Part I outlines our new 
macrotheory of the Court and investigates how it is similar to, and 
different from, two other prominent theories of the judiciary—the 
legal and the political accounts of judicial decisionmaking. Part II 
explains our data collection procedures and outlines the various 
empirical models that constitute the tests of our theory. In Part III, 
we describe the results of our empirical assessment, which, to 
reiterate, show that the Justices rely on the economy as a signal of 
 
 9. For an explanation of why we focus on taxation in these two specific eras, see infra 
notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Table 5: The Business Cycle; see also Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009) (providing the chronology of economic peaks and troughs as identified by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research). 
 11. E.g., ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 285–87; see also Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
supra note 10 (providing the chronology of economic peaks and troughs as identified by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research). 
 12. See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part III and accompanying text. 
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policymaking competence in periods of the “typical” business cycle 
but defer to the government in times of economic emergencies, 
including the Great Depression. We conclude by discussing the limits 
of our findings, as well as future applications of our theoretical 
approach. 
I.  A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT 
A. The Economy as a Signal 
Our account begins with what we believe is an uncontroversial 
claim: the Justices, like virtually all policymakers and citizens, prefer 
national prosperity to a deteriorating economy plagued by high 
unemployment, high inflation, and low productivity. Perhaps this 
preference emerges from the Justices’ role as national leaders in the 
development of law and legal policy, or perhaps it stems from their 
status as individuals who care very much about their own private 
investments and purchasing power. We do not seek to explain why 
the Justices prefer national economic success to failure; rather our 
point is this: the Justices gain utility from certain economic conditions 
and suffer disutility from others. 
Our theory, of course, does not stop with this simple conjecture. 
We further hypothesize that the Justices act in a manner that 
promotes their economic interests through the decisionmaking 
process. Specifically, we theorize that members of the Court seek to 
foster competent economic management in the elected branches of 
government by expressing support for executive and legislative 
policies in times of economic prosperity and disapproval during 
certain kinds of economic downturns—those that the Justices believe 
are the product of inept government management. We offer more 
detail on this component of our theory in this Section,14 but first we 
highlight that our account suggests that the Justices implement a 
sanctioning system that will directly affect the U.S. government when 
litigating and defending economic policies before the Supreme Court; 
when the economy is expanding, our theory predicts that the Justices 
will favor the government’s legal position, but as the economy 
contracts we expect that the Justices will take a dim view of the 
government’s policy or program and cast a greater number of votes 
against the government’s legal interest. 
 
 14. See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
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Our account, thus, indicates that Justices act like voters during 
election cycles. Just as voters take cues from the economy, attributing 
good economic times to effective policymaking in the elected 
branches of government and (most) bad economic times to 
government incompetence,15 so do the Justices. And just as voters 
punish (or reward) politicians based on the relative state of the 
economy, so too do the Justices. Of course, the Justices, unlike voters, 
do not have the power to throw out (or retain) incumbents, but they 
can reject (or support) the government’s policies through their 
judicial decisionmaking process. Assuming, as we do, that both the 
voters and the Justices rationally prefer economic prosperity to 
economic loss, the electoral success of the incumbent government 
along with its win rate in Court should trend with national economic 
conditions. 
Importantly, we do not theorize that the Justices, or voters 
generally, treat every economic downturn equivalently or even 
primarily as caused by government ineptitude. As suggested above, 
we theorize—along with most macroeconomists—that economic 
trends are associated not only with the choices made by the nation’s 
leaders but also with unrelated and unexpected shocks to the 
economy such as wars, oil price fluctuations, trade barriers imposed 
by foreign governments, harvest failures, and so forth.16 This is a 
distinction with meaning: when the voters and, more importantly for 
our project, the Justices view the downturn as a product of 
substandard government policy choices—not of uncontrollable and 
exogenous shocks—they will often punish the elected branches at the 
ballot box and in the courtroom. But when the Justices believe that 
the economic crisis is the result of factors largely beyond the control 
of the government, they will often not sanction federal policymakers 
but instead seek to work as a team with the other branches of 
government to remedy the national crisis, much as voters and judges 
tend to rally around the president in times of foreign threats and 
nationwide emergencies.17 
 
 15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 16. See ALBERTO ALESINA & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, PARTISAN POLITICS, DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 195 (1995) (exploring “political” and “nonpolitical” shock 
to the economy); ALESINA ET AL., supra note 1, at 47 (same); DUCH & STEVENSON, supra note 
2, at 131–77 (same). 
 17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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Economic experts cannot hope to distinguish precisely between 
these two types of economic downturns18—those caused by 
policymaking failures and those that emerge from outside forces—
and we do not believe that the Justices have higher levels of economic 
proficiency than trained professionals. Indeed, it is possible, perhaps 
likely, that a complex amalgamation of factors inside and outside of 
the government’s control influences national economic conditions, 
making it extremely difficult to distinguish useful federal policies 
from those that impose harm across the nation. Again, we do not 
expect the Justices to have skill and expertise regarding modern 
macroeconomic theory, but we do suppose they are able to 
distinguish typical and recurrent economic downturns, often labeled 
recessions, from atypical and rare conditions associated widespread 
poverty and hardship such as that observed in the 1930s (and also, 
perhaps, during the serious national economic decline that began in 
2008) and described as depressions.19 Regarding the typical ups and 
downs that routinely take place in the economy, the Justices will 
assign blame (credit) to Congress and the president out of a belief 
(right or wrong) that the economic peaks and troughs lie within the 
policymakers’ control. In atypical catastrophic periods, however, the 
Justices will view economic conditions as primarily attributable to a 
series of unexplained and exogenous shocks beyond the control of the 
government and so will not seek to hold policymakers accountable. 
Actually, as we suggest above, they will do quite the opposite: like 
voters, the Justices will join with the government to fend off the crisis. 
It is no mystery why we theorize that the economic downturns 
associated with a typical business cycle—or more technically, the 
repeated sequence of recessions, giving way to periods of prosperity, 
which are then followed again by recessions—serve as a judicial proxy 
 
 18. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282–440 (outlining the concept of the business cycle 
and competing accounts of how and why the cycles emerge along with policymaking choices for 
addressing economic downturns); see also FARROKH K. LANGDANA, MACROECONOMIC 
POLICY: DEMYSTIFYING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 51–52 (2002) (describing the theory 
of the business cycle in Keynesian macroeconomics). 
 19. As early as 1946, macroeconomists defined the typical business cycle as follows: “a 
cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, 
followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the 
expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in 
duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years.” ARTHUR F. 
BURNS & WESLEY C. MITCHELL, MEASURING BUSINESS CYCLES 3 (1946) (emphasis added). 
At the same time, experts note that “[s]ometimes—fortunately, not very often—these episodes 
have been severe and prolonged” and “[i]f the recession is particularly severe, it becomes a 
depression.” ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282, 283. 
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for government policymaking failure. Our account reflects the extant 
literature in both political science and economics on the relevant 
incentives of elected officials—specifically that presidents (and 
members of Congress) are often willing to ignore, tolerate, or even 
risk short-term national economic losses in off-election years for 
political gain.20 The idea that politicians willingly adopt targeted 
legislation for favored groups, often to the detriment of the aggregate 
public, has become widely viewed as an empirical regularity by most 
scholars of political economy.21 At the same time, the literature 
suggests that elected officials will work hard to fend off protracted 
periods of (costly) economic distortion given that such conditions not 
only cause widespread and serious damage to citizens across the 
nation, but also to the long-term political reputations of incumbents.22 
If this is so—if elected officials have an incentive to shirk in the short 
term but not the long term, if they are willing to risk a series of minor 
recessions but not vast and widespread depression-like conditions—
then it is perfectly reasonable for the Justices (and voters) to believe 
that the economic downturns that take place during the typical 
business cycle are the product of inept policies, whereas economic 
crises (that is, precisely the economic conditions elected officials seek 
to avoid) are beyond their control. 
If our account accurately captures the Court’s interest in 
promoting proficient policymaking, then it has strong empirical 
implications. First, we expect the Justices to reward the elected 
branches of government for periods of prosperity by adopting a 
progovernment position in litigation involving economic policy. Put 
another way, the government’s win rate should positively correlate 
with various economic indicators, such as employment rates, 
industrial production levels, GDP, and so forth. Conversely, when the 
economy turns sour and the Justices hold elected actors responsible 
out of a belief they have privileged their short-term electoral 
interests—that is, during recessionary periods—we expect the Justices 
 
 20. See sources cited supra notes 16–18. 
 21. For a terrific description of the modern theories of Congress, see generally C. 
LAWRENCE EVANS & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS UNDER FIRE: REFORM POLITICS AND 
THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 166–72 (1997); FORREST MALTZMAN, COMPETING PRINCIPALS: 
COMMITTEES, PARTIES, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 9–32 (1997); ERIK 
SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5–12 (2001); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive 
Theories of Congressional Institutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149, 158 (1994). 
 22. See sources cited supra note 21. 
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to punish the bad policy choices by ruling against the government. If 
the Justices believe, however, that Congress and the president could 
not have prevented the downturn if only because the crisis worked 
against their electoral prospects—that is, during deep depressions—
we do not expect the Justices to hold them responsible or even to 
second-guess their policymaking choices. In fact, we hypothesize that 
the Justices will support the national government in its attempt to 
stabilize the economy by deferring to its arguments in the economic 
cases that appear on the docket. 
These implications are relatively straightforward to assess and 
we undertake that task in Part III. But before turning to the empirical 
tests, two matters deserve attention. One concerns the relationship 
between our account of judicial decisionmaking and the various other 
theories of the Court in the literature. We explain how our new 
theory fits within this literature in Section C. The second centers on 
two questions about judicial behavior, specifically (1) why we expect 
members of the Court considering cases involving economic policy to 
align with the voting public and not the governing elite and (2) what 
goals the Justices seek to achieve if, in fact, they vote in a manner that 
is consistent with our macrotheory. We address both questions in 
Section B. 
B. Judicial Behavior: Voting with the Masses to Achieve Elite Goals? 
Why would the Justices, as political appointees (nominated by 
the president and approved by the Senate), echo or ally themselves 
with the voting masses on economic issues and not with the 
Washington elite who helped place them in power? The answer to 
this question is simple: it is in the Justices’ best interests to side with 
the voters. Recall that our theory is grounded in the idea that the 
Justices prefer economic growth and stability to conditions associated 
with economic decline. If the Justices believe that Congress and the 
president are shirking their management responsibilities for, say, 
political gain, and that this shirking has negatively affected the 
economy, then it is entirely rational for the Justices to punish this 
behavior in an effort to encourage policymakers to act in the best 
interests of the nation. In short, if the Justices are able to mitigate the 
impact of bad policy choices through the judicial process, Congress 
and the president will be less likely to make bad economic decisions 
in the future. 
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Similarly, it is rational for the Justices to support the government 
in its economic efforts if they believe outside forces have led to a 
severe economic setback. In these circumstances, sanctioning elected 
officials through the judicial decisionmaking process may aggravate 
the nation’s declining economic circumstances, thereby undermining 
the judicial goal of a stable and growing economy. Theorizing that the 
Justices will increase their level of cooperation with the elected 
branches in periods of a national crisis does not lead to the conclusion 
that they suddenly become altruistic—they do not.23 Rather, our 
approach to cooperation that is sparked by economic crisis suggests 
that the advantages associated with putting the economy back on 
track align with the Justices’ preference for national prosperity.24 
 
 23. Dean Tjosvold, Cooperation Theory, Constructive Controversy, and Effectiveness: 
Learning from Crisis, in TEAM EFFECTIVENESS AND DECISION MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 
79, 89 (Richard A. Guzzo & Eduardo Salas eds., 1995) (suggesting that cooperation is not 
explained by individual altruism but by rational self-interested behavior). 
 24. The notion that the Justices’ utility is linked to their level of teamwork with Congress 
and the president is consistent with much of the existing literature on the Court. A number of 
political and economic theorists have adopted the team model to investigate and explain various 
features of the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-
Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1605–
13 (1995) (adopting a team model to explain the hierarchical structure of the courts); Steven 
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 408–10 
(1995) (same); Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Law Creation by a Team of 
Judges 1–21 (May 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.northwestern. 
edu/faculty/conferences/research/Kornhauser.pdf (same). Moreover, just as the idea that the 
Court will at times engage in a team effort to advance broad social goals is not new, the idea 
that exposure or vulnerability to harm or loss increases individuals’ desire to cooperate is not 
novel. This dynamic—perceived vulnerability leading to increased levels of cooperation—has 
been observed in many contexts in both the private and public spheres. See, e.g., LAURENCE 
BARTON, CRISIS IN ORGANIZATIONS: MANAGING AND COMMUNICATING IN THE HEAT OF 
CHAOS 3–4 (1993); Tjosvold, supra note 23, at 80.  Various scholars explain the phenomenon by 
noting the widespread belief that individual utility is directly linked to group effort in times of 
perceived threat; others argue that cooperation can be explained by the improved guidance and 
direction that tend to emerge from group leaders in times of stress. But few scholars who study 
cooperation and teamwork question its existence and its increased level in times of crisis. 
Indeed, when it comes to federal lawmaking, a number of economic historians have noted the 
readiness of policymakers to set aside partisan and ideological conflict to unite the government 
and to better address national emergencies. See BARTON, supra, at 20–22; Tjosvold, supra note 
23, at 86–92 (describing increased levels of teamwork during crises); see also ROBERT HIGGS, 
CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
147–50 (1987) (describing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to war measures, 
which often is seen as being slanted in favor of the government and out of line with the Court’s 
other decisions); HAROLD C. RELYEA, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 7 (2007) (explaining 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of emergency presidential power during the Great 
Depression); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1671 (2003) (noting that collegiality and a group approach leads to better 
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Cooperation and teamwork do not mean the Court will work 
alongside Congress and the president to identify creative solutions to 
the macroeconomic policy problems facing the nation. Rather, it is far 
more likely that cooperation, if it exists, will emerge in the form of 
increased deference to the U.S. government as litigant. This reflects 
the Justices’ lack of expertise on economic issues, which strongly 
contrasts with their expertise on legal and constitutional issues.25 With 
limited information and know-how, the Justices will not seek to 
participate in the creation of new macroeconomic policy but will 
defer to the elected branches of government, which have greater 
ability, experience, and knowledge to address economic issues. 
Another set of questions centers on efficacy: Even assuming, as 
we do, that the Justices rationally prefer economic prosperity to 
economic loss, why would this preference affect the judicial process in 
any observable way? Put differently, is it rational for the Justices to 
believe they can promote effective policymaking in the elected 
branches of government via their own decisionmaking process? This 
question arises because the causal link between writing judicial 
opinions and inducing policies and programs that promote national 
economic interests is ambiguous (even if the Justices are capable of 
rendering credible opinions on economic questions). 
As it turns out, though, our argument that rational Justices will 
look to the economy as a signal of policymaking competence in the 
elected branches of government and will use their decisionmaking 
power to support (or impede) the policies and programs that emerge 
does not rest on the idea that Congress and the president will 
immediately transform their economic policies in response to these 
disciplinary measures. To be sure, a systematic decrease in the 
government win rate in the face of a deteriorating economy is not the 
preferred outcome of any administration, but we do not argue that 
this penalty is equal to that threatened by the general voting public. 
Instead, we argue that Justices may view their ability to refuse to 
implement flawed policies and programs as a way to encourage better 
economic management in the elected branches of government at the 
margin. More importantly, we posit that judicial refusal to implement 
 
jurisprudence); Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 
1612–18 (2002) (explaining the emergence of altruism in the face of social dilemmas). 
 25. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 263–398 (4th ed. 2007) 
(providing data on Justices’ backgrounds which reveals that they have not had much economic 
training). 
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perceived policy failures could work to limit possible damage to the 
economy, thereby advancing the interests of the Justices. Similarly, in 
times of crisis, we simply argue that the Court’s progovernment bias 
will assist Congress and the president in the recovery effort, again 
promoting the Justices’ interests in economic growth and stability. 
C. Differences between the Macrotheory of the Court and the Legal 
and Political Models of Decisionmaking 
Before we begin to assess our theoretical and empirical claims, 
an additional matter deserves some attention: how do the other 
extant theories of judicial decisionmaking treat economic conditions? 
This is an important question to raise for the following reason: if our 
theoretical approach, however distinct it may be, yields precisely the 
same implications as other theories, we will be unable to assess which 
of the accounts best explains the decisions we observe. A review of 
the two leading extant theories, the legal and the political, however, 
suggests that this potential problem of equivalence is not likely to be 
much of a concern. 
Legal approaches suggest that the Justices rendering opinions in 
cases and controversies privilege existing legal tenets and doctrine; 
they are neutral deciders who look to the U.S. Constitution, statutes, 
judicial precedent, and various other legally relevant materials to 
maximize the correctness of answers to the legal issues presented.26 
Accounts of this sort do not necessarily imply that the Justices have 
no personal preferences or are always in agreement with the 
controlling legal precedent;27 rather, they hold that the Justices are 
willing to set aside their views in order to create a rational, efficient, 
and fair collection of laws and legal policies that ultimately are 
perceived to promote the greater social good.28 Political theories of 
 
 26. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects 
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 & n.20 (1994) (noting that the consensus 
scholarly and judicial view on “correct outcomes” is that they reflect adherence to superior 
court rulings); Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 1612. 
 27. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 26, at 27 n.99 (“[D]eference need not be based on the 
assumption that the first court reached the correct result. Rather, the doctrines of stare decisis 
and hierarchical precedent are based on the realization that various institutional and substantive 
values are served, at least generally, if prior interpretations (whether or not correct) are 
maintained into the present and future.”). 
 28. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) 
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 835–40 (2003) (providing a brief discussion of the values 
in federal court decisionmaking and in the standing context in particular). Many scholars and 
jurists subscribing to this theory believe, for example, that judicial obedience to and compliance 
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judicial decisionmaking, by contrast, assume that the Justices have 
political preferences that they seek to embed in their opinions.29 The 
political theory does not ignore precedent or law-related factors but 
views the development of doctrine as a way to implement partisan 
and ideological viewpoints and to keep lower court judges in line.30 
Unlike the legal theory, however, the political theory of adjudication 
views legal doctrine as a mechanism to realize judicial politics rather 
than a path to inevitable, neutral, or fair outcomes based on full 
consideration of the legal issues presented. The assumption that the 
Justices pursue their own goals and aims does not always lead to the 
conclusion that individual Justices have little regard for others and no 
 
with the law leads to the uniform treatment of litigants and thus a perception of fairness. 
Moreover, law and doctrine is arguably valuable because it enables individuals to predict 
outcomes, which, in turn, permits an understanding of social and business interactions, allows 
reliance on expectations, creates disincentives to litigate every conflict, and ultimately deters 
expenditure of private and judicial resources. Finally, many argue that adherence to the law 
fosters respect for the judiciary because it demonstrates that the Justices draw on a body of law 
that represents collective experience over time rather than upon their own political and 
ideological viewpoints. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that 
the strongest rationale for binding precedent is its usefulness in assuring like cases are treated 
alike); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION 69–72 (1961) (noting the link between fairness and binding precedent); see also 
WASSERSTROM, supra, at 60 (stating that precedent is useful because it enables certainty that 
would otherwise be impossible); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course 
and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–54 (2001) 
(arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is an appeal to a general principle of equality, a 
“cousin [to] the Kantian principle of universalizability and the biblical Golden Rule,” and that 
the public will view judicial decisionmaking as fair and not capricious if based on precedent); 
David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (stating 
that predictability in judicial decisionmaking is a key rationale for adhering to precedent). 
 29. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2000); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive 
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995) (stating 
the assumption that judges do not check their politics at the courtroom door, but rather act to 
bring policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome). 
 30. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 68 (Spring 1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court uses legal doctrine as 
a signal to lower courts about the range of opinions and outcomes that it will tolerate); 
McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1641–56 (discussing precedent as a reflection of political 
preferences); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 740–
50 (1984) (looking at organization in the context of a firm); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal 
& Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme 
Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 673–92 (1994); see also Chad 
Westerland et al., Lower Court Defiance of (Compliance with) the U.S. Supreme Court 5–6 
(Apr. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/ 
research/conferencepapers.2006MPSA.pdf (discussing three different but related branches of 
agency theory). 
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respect for the rule of law;31 the point of the political theory is that the 
Justices are not objective decisionmakers who check their personal 
opinions on legal controversies at the courtroom door.32 Instead the 
Justices have personal viewpoints and give them weight when issuing 
decisions.33 
How do these theories of adjudication account for 
macroeconomic trends? The answer: macroeconomic trends are 
completely irrelevant to the decisionmaking process in both models. 
In the legal model, the Court’s responsibility is to ensure that 
government policies comply with the mandates of relevant federal 
laws and, absent a legal breach, the Court will uphold the government 
activity as entirely legitimate. The legal model, in its most extreme 
form, gives no consideration to the individual views of the Justices or 
to national political, economic, or cultural trends, unless they are 
somehow embedded into the law through the majoritarian process. 
Giving consideration to these extralegal factors would undermine the 
very purpose of the legal approach. Rather than merely applying the 
relevant law, the Justices would be forced to study the economy. 
Similarly situated litigants would be denied uniform treatment in the 
courtroom, and perceptions of fairness would be damaged. In short, if 
economic cycles could alter judicial interpretation of the laws, 
litigants would be governed by the economy and not by law at all. 
 
 31. McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1636. 
 32. Indeed, even members of the federal bench acknowledge that judges are rational actors 
seeking to embed their own ideas and views into the decisions they reach; judicial 
decisionmakers, Judge Posner argues, seek to “impose their political vision on society” through 
opinions and rulings, just as an artist imposes an aesthetic vision on society through art. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 121 (1995); see also Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking 
in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1472 (2003) (supporting the theory 
that judges make decisions based upon policy preferences, especially with the increase in the 
number of clerkships). 
 33. McNollgast, supra note 29, at 1635. Some scholars criticize judges who have strong 
beliefs and then act upon them in the decisionmaking process, but this policy-oriented approach 
is not universally disfavored. Indeed, some argue that if a judge believes the Constitution 
requires an interpretation that conflicts with past precedent, the judge must ignore the 
precedent when deciding cases. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against 
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–38 (1994) (arguing that if a court believes the 
Constitution and precedent are in conflict, it just ignores the precedent); see also Orley 
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence 
of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (stating that 
judges’ political interests may have a role in shaping outcomes but this is not necessarily 
disturbing); Caminker, supra note 26, at 2–3 (discussing situations in which judges adhered to 
their own idiosyncratic political or legal views despite clear Supreme Court precedent to the 
contrary and noting scholars’ diverse reactions). 
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Similarly, the political model leaves no room for macroeconomic 
factors to affect judicial outcomes. The Justices may have strong 
partisan positions on macroeconomic policymaking; various scholars, 
for example, have theorized that members of the left-leaning parties 
are more concerned with unemployment and growth and relatively 
less concerned with inflation, whereas members of right-leaning 
parties have just the opposite preferences.34 But these preferences 
show up in the judicial decisionmaking process in systematic choices 
in favor of the government or private individuals and do not change 
with economic contractions and expansions. Indeed, judicial theorists 
subscribing to the political theory assume that ideological preferences 
are stable throughout the Justices’ careers35 and thus cannot shift with 
the business cycle. Although this stability assumption is not explicit in 
the extant literature, it can be found in nearly all the existing 
measures of judicial preference and ideology as well in the empirical 
tests of judicial decisionmaking.36 
In sum, our macrotheory of the Court argues that the Supreme 
Court Justices, like most elected officials and citizens, gain utility 
from national economic prosperity and disutility from declining 
economic conditions. The theory, in turn, implies that judicial voting 
will cycle with the economy; the Justices, in short, will seek to use 
their decisionmaking power to promote adept policymaking inside 
the executive and legislative branches of government. The legal and 
political theories of the Court, by contrast, do not see a role for 
economic conditions in the decisionmaking process; the former 
suggests that legal rules explain judicial trends, whereas the latter 
implies that observed outcomes are based on political preferences. 
 
 34. ALESINA ET AL., supra note 1, at 47. 
 35. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme Court Justices 
from Different Periods, 42 W. POL. Q. 509, 513–14 (1989). 
 36. Teams of scholars have begun to question the widespread assumption of preference 
stability, but no scholar has yet offered a theory to explain why or when the Justices will alter 
their political viewpoints. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A 
Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 806–08 (1998); Lee Epstein et 
al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1483, 1485–86, 1493–97 (2007). Our macrotheory of the Court offers a theoretical 
account for this finding in the economic context. If the Justices do indeed modify their 
decisionmaking to account for national economic cycles then we would expect ideological drift: 
both liberal and conservative Justices would show an increased propensity to favor the federal 
government when the economy turns sour. Because decisions that work in favor of the 
government are perceived as liberal if rendered in the economic context, the theory would 
suggest that Justices will systematically appear more liberal in times of economic downturn and 
more conservative in times of economic upturn. 
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II.  ASSESSING A MACROTHEORY OF THE COURT 
Having outlined our theory and addressed some important 
questions, we turn to a simple empirical test of our model. In Section 
A, we outline our overall assessment plan and the steps we took to 
implement it, and in Part III we report our results. In this preliminary 
study, as noted in Part I, we find quite a bit of support for a 
macrotheory of the Court. 
A. The Basic Plan 
Our primary objective is to develop a richer and more systematic 
understanding of whether and how the economy affects judicial 
decisionmaking. To advance our understanding of the Court, we 
conducted a preliminary test of our macrotheory of the judiciary in 
the context of federal taxation cases decided in two historical eras of 
the twentieth century: 1912–1930 and 1930–1940. 
Our focus on these two historical eras reflects our theoretical 
account. Whereas the economy experienced ups and downs during 
both eras, our theory anticipated different responses from the 
Justices. For cases in the first era—an era of relative prosperity, 
though with the typical ups and downs—we expected to find the 
Court rewarding the government during peaks and punishing it 
during the (relative) downturns. In the second era—when, by any 
definition, the country experienced an economic crisis of epic 
proportions37—we expected precisely the opposite: that the Justices 
would join with the other branches in an effort to prevent even 
further decline, deferring to, not punishing, the government in its 
litigation efforts. However preliminary, we think this test of our 
theory is a particularly difficult one. Given the voluminous literature 
on the showdown between President Roosevelt and the Court, it 
would seem—in contrast to our theory—that the Justices did anything 
but defer to the government in times of economic crisis.38 We shall 
see. 
 
 37. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 285–86 (“The worst economic contraction in the 
history of the United States was the Great Depression of the 1930s. . . . To appreciate how 
severe the Great Depression was, compare it with the two worst post-World War II recessions 
of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982. In contrast to the 30% real GDP decline and 25% unemployment 
rate of the Great Depression, in the 1973-1975 recession real GDP fell by 3.4% and the 
unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 9%; in the 1981-1982 recession real GDP fell by 
2.8% and the unemployment rate rose from about 7% to about 11%.”). 
 38. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 86–114 
(1941); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
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We could use several legal contexts to test our theory, but we 
believe that taxation is an excellent venue for investigating the effects 
of the economy on judicial behavior for several reasons. First, our 
theory implies that the U.S. government’s win rate in the Supreme 
Court will correlate with economic conditions; thus, a useful test of 
the theory requires a collection of cases involving the U.S. 
government. Second, policymakers and macroeconomists widely 
believe that tax laws can and should be used to effectuate economic 
growth and stability,39 and thus it is reasonable to expect the Justices 
to rely on economic outcomes in assessing challenged government tax 
policies. Finally, Congress and the president have constantly revised 
the tax laws over the periods of this study and thus we have quite a bit 
of variation in the data, thereby enabling a full and complete 
investigation of our theory.40 
B. Implementing the Plan 
Having outlined our basic plan, we turn to the specific features of 
our empirical test. Because we sought to explain the outcomes in 
federal tax cases, both for and against the government, the first order 
of business was to amass a dataset of every tax case argued before the 
Court between 1913, when the Court heard its first federal tax 
challenge to the modern corporate and individual tax laws, and 1940.41 
 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82–162 (1995); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE 
SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 98 (rev. ed. 1968); ROBERT G. MCCLOKSEY AS 
REVISED BY STANFORD LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 91 (4th ed. 2005); 
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE NEW 
LEGALITY, 1932–1968, at 28–55 (1970). 
 39. LANGDANA, supra note 18, at 10. 
 40. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX 75–109 (1985); see also STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR 
AND TAXES 49–90 (2008) (exploring changes in American tax policy between World Wars I and 
II). 
 41. Congress enacted the first modern individual income tax legislation in 1913 following 
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN & 
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5 (14th ed. 2006). Four years prior, in 1909, 
Congress enacted the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, which levied a tax on corporate income 
and has been viewed as a stepping stone toward the modern income tax. See Act of Aug. 5, 
1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53 (1990). For cases stemming from the 
individual income tax enacted after the Sixteenth Amendment, the earliest oral arguments in 
our sample occurred on October 14, 1915. Cases in our sample with oral arguments before this 
date related to the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909. 
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To do so, we conducted a Lexis search on the word “tax.”42 We 
reviewed each case produced by the search, retaining only those that 
involved the Justices’ interpretation of a federal tax statute. Thus, we 
excluded state taxation cases, as well as cases that involved tax fraud 
but no statutory interpretation problem. This resulted in a collection 
of 594 cases, dispersed over twenty-eight years. As Figure 1 depicts, 
the distribution of cases is rather uneven—the Justices heard and 
decided more cases during the second era of our study than the first 
(about 10.4 per year through 1929 and 38.9 per year thereafter).43 
Figure 1.  Tax Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court by Year of Oral 
Argument, 1913–1940 
 
 
 42. The Lexis search that we conducted read as follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s 
tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!) or (tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) 
or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or (internal w/s revenue) or (tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s 
code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s tax!) or 
(employment w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund) or 
(tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. w/s 
tax!). We selected only those cases with oral arguments between 1913 and 1940. We then 
refined our search as described infra text accompanying note 43. 
 43. This difference appears to be due to a change in the Court’s preference for tax cases as 
the total number of cases decided by the Court actually declined somewhat during the 1930s 
relative to the pre-1930s period of our analysis.  This change in preference may correspond to an 
underlying change in the nature of the tax cases heard that we have not accounted for, and as 
such it represents a potential limitation of our analysis. 
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With the cases in hand, we coded our primary dependent 
variable (that is, what we hope to explain) in two different ways. We 
first coded the Court’s Outcome as a binary variable: whether the 
government won (=1) or lost (=0) and, for robustness checks, we also 
coded the government’s share of votes, which is the fraction of 
Justices participating in the case and voting in the government’s 
favor.44 A Vote Share of 0 indicates a unanimous decision in the 
private litigant’s favor, a Vote Share of 1 indicates a unanimous 
decision in the government’s favor, a Vote Share of .5 indicates that 50 
percent of the sitting Justices voted with the government, and so 
forth. 
Table 1 supplies summary statistics for Outcome and Vote Share 
(along with all other variables in our study), so we need not say too 
much more about them. Suffice it to note that the difference in the 
government’s win rate—however measured—between the two eras of 
interest is not statistically significantly different.45 The question is 
whether the U.S. government’s success is correlated at statistically 
significant levels with the economic contractions and expansions 
occurring within those periods (consistent with our economic model) 
or whether the government’s success is simply constant over time (as 
the legal model would predict)46 or associated with the political values 
of the Justices (as the political model predicts). 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
(Proportion) 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Outcome  .658 .475 0 (US lost) 1 (US won) 
 
 44. We run our primary tests with the binary outcome variable as the dependent variable, 
and then we perform another set of tests with the share of votes as the dependent variable. The 
purpose of this second set of tests is to check whether the results we obtain in the primary test 
still hold true when we conduct similar but somewhat differently structured tests. In this way, we 
check whether our primary analysis is robust to changes in the particular type of analysis we 
perform. 
 45. The difference in the rates is not statistically significant if it is small enough that it is 
likely to occur by random chance. In general, a value is statistically significant if the probability 
that it would occur by random chance is lower than some specified threshold confidence level. 
Throughout this work, we use a 5 percent confidence level for statistical significance, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 46. Under the legal model, the government’s win rate will not change in a statistically 
significant way over time if the characteristics of the cases heard do not change in a statistically 
significant way. Thus, when the economic climate changes, we expect a roughly constant win 
rate for the government, provided that the nature of the cases heard remains roughly constant. 
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     Pre-1930 .607 .490 0 1 
     1930s .678 .468 0 1 
Vote Share .652 .440 0 (no votes for US) 1 (unanimous for 
US) 
     Pre-1930 .600 .461 0 1 
     1930s .671 .431 0 1 
Economic Cycles .557 .497 0 (contraction) 1 (expansion) 
     Pre-1930 .675 .470 0 1 
     1930s .512 .500 0 1 
Industrial 
Production 
.001 .032 -.089 .166 
     1919–1929 .004 .029 -.082 .094 
     1930s .000 .033 -.088 .166 
Fraction 
Republicans on 
Court 
.655 .148 .22 .78 
     Pre-1930 .755 .046 .67 .78 
     1930s .616 .156 .22 .78 
Government is 
Petitioner 
.551 .497 0 (respondent) 1 (petitioner) 
     Pre-1930 .560 .498 0 1 
     1930s .547 .498 0 1 
Corporate 
Taxpayer 
.364 .481 0 (not corporate) 1 (corporate) 
     Pre-1930 .373 .485 0 1 
     1930s .360 .480 0 1 
War-Related Law .059 .236 0 (no) 1 (yes) 
     Pre-1930 .096 .296 0 1 
     1930s .044 .206 0 1 
This brings us to our study’s independent variables—those we 
(or others) think explain the government’s success or lack thereof. 
For our approach, the key variable of interest is the state of the 
economy. As noted above, we hoped to tap into both the “typical” 
business cycle—the repeated sequence of economic expansion, giving 
way to a decline, and then followed by recovery—as well as the 
extreme conditions that emerged during the Great Depression. Were 
we analyzing litigation in, say, the last several decades, we could turn 
to any number of indicators associated with the economy, including 
consumption, investment, employment, or inflation. Unfortunately, 
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reliable historical data are rare and thus we have only a limited 
selection of measures. Two that are valid, reliable, and available for 
(most of) the years in our study are Economic Cycles and Industrial 
Production. 
Cycles is the series of economic peaks (high points) and troughs 
(low points) as identified by the NBER Dating Committee. After the 
economy peaks, aggregate economic activity tends to fall, sending the 
economy into an official contraction or recession. After the economy 
reaches a trough, it tends to return to a period of expansion, booming 
until it hits the next peak in the cycle. To incorporate cycles into our 
statistical model, we coded the relative state of the economy at the 
time the Justices heard oral argument—either at expansion (=1) or 
contraction (=0).47 Industrial Production measures the change in 
output for the industrial sector of the economy, including 
manufacturing, mining, and utilities.48 For Industrial Production, we 
identified the average percentage change in industrial production 
over the month prior to oral argument for each case heard since 1919 
(the first year for which we could locate reliable data). 
Finally, we gathered data on several other covariates that 
scholars have suggested explain the Court’s decisions. Beginning with 
political accounts of judging, for each case we coded the fraction of 
Justices appointed by Republican presidents. Theoretically this 
variable could range from 0 to 1, but empirically the proportion of 
Republican-appointed Justices in the dataset ranges from .22 to .78.49 
Our reasoning, in line with the extant literature,50 was that, at least for 
our time frame, a Court dominated by Republican appointees would 
be less likely to support government efforts to regulate the economy 
than a Court populated by Democrats.51 Along a similar vein, we 
incorporated a variable indicating whether or not the United States 
was the petitioner (=1) or the respondent (=0) in the Supreme Court. 
This controls for the propensity of (at least) the modern-day Court to 
 
 47. See infra Table 5: The Business Cycle. For a complete historical table of the business 
cycle, see Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, supra note 10. 
 48. Although these sectors contribute only a small portion of GDP, they are highly 
sensitive to interest rates and consumer demand and thus industrial production is viewed as an 
important tool for forecasting national economic performances. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 300. 
 49. See supra Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
 50. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of 
Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2006). 
 51. In our database, Democratic Courts decided 59 percent of the cases (n=488); 
Republican Courts, 41 percent (n=339). 
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reverse lower court decisions, which, in turn, may reflect strategic 
political considerations on the part of the Justices.52 
Finally, two other covariates reflect the substantive focus of our 
study, taxation. One variable is whether the party opposing the 
government is a corporate taxpayer or not. We included this variable 
for two reasons. First, Congress implemented the individual income 
tax in 1913 under highly contentious circumstances53 and thus it is 
possible that the Justices’ views of the individual and corporate 
income taxes diverged for any number of reasons unrelated to the 
observable variables in our model. Second, previous empirical work 
suggests that judicial political preferences are more evident in 
corporate tax cases than in other contexts. Thus controlling for the 
party opposing the government enabled us to better parse the 
possible political factors at work.54 We also added a control for 
whether the tax measure at issue in the litigation was related to a war-
related law, such as the War Revenue Act of 1917. Our data indicate 
that the Justices are highly predisposed to favor the government in 
war-related cases,55 and by adding this control we were able to obtain 
more precise results (that is, lower standard errors for the 
independent variables of interest). 
C. Statistical Models and Predictions 
For purposes of identifying the possible influence of national 
economic conditions on the U.S. Supreme Court, we examined the 
effects of macroeconomic variables on the probability of a win for the 
federal government. To this end, as we just noted, we specified two 
dependent variables: Outcome, which is simply whether the 
government won (=1) or lost (=0); and Vote Share, which is the 
percentage of Justices on the Court who voted with the government. 
Owing to the high correlation between our independent variables, 
Economic Cycle and Industrial Production, we could not use both in 
 
 52. Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 
39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 390–91 (1982). 
 53. For a discussion of the history leading up to the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment and the subsequent enactment of the modern income tax in 1913, see KLEIN ET 
AL., supra note 41, at 4–5. 
 54. See Staudt et al., supra note 50, at 1800. 
 55. Over the course of the entire pre-1930 and 1930s eras, the cases in our data set have a 
government win rate of approximately 65 percent overall, but this number increases to 
approximately 80 percent when only cases dealing with war-related laws are considered. 
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the same statistical model.56 Accordingly, we constructed separate 
models, hoping that they would produce consistent results regardless 
of the particular economic indicator. If our theory holds, both 
indicators should be positively correlated with the government’s win 
rate during the first period (pre-1930) and negatively correlated 
during the second period (the Depression years). 
For the dependent variable, Outcome, we used a logit model to 
determine the effect of the economy on the case outcome. This type 
of model expresses the probability of a government win in terms of 
the inverse logit function. The models for our two different economic 
independent variables are 
( )ittit ycleEconomic_CY βX++== − 101logit)1Pr( ββ            (1) 
( )ittit n_ProductioIndustrialY βX++== − 101logit)1Pr( ββ  (2) 
in which Yit is the value of the Outcome variable in case i in month t. 
In each model, the coefficient β1 represents the influence of the 
economy on the probability of a government win. The expression βXit 
denotes the other independent variables for which we controlled, 
including the fraction of Republican appointees on the Court, a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the United States is the appellant and 0 
otherwise, a binary variable equal to 1 if the taxpayer is a corporation 
and 0 otherwise, and a binary variable equal to 1 if the law is related 
to a war and 0 otherwise. 
For the dependent variable, Vote Share, we used an ordinary 
least squares model to determine the effect of the economy on the 
case outcome. The models for our two different economic 
independent variables in this case are 
ittit ycleEconomic_CY βX++= 10 ββ                                       (3) 
ittit n_ProductioIndustrialY βX++= 10 ββ                              (4) 
in which Yit is the value of the Vote Share variable in case i in month t. 
The coefficient β1 again represents the influence of the economy on 
 
 56. The models we use require independent variables in a single model to be uncorrelated. 
If this requirement is not met, there is said to be collinearity between the variables, which can 
cause biased estimates of the results as well as inflated error terms. See JACK JOHNSTON & 
JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 89 (4th ed. 1997). 
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the probability of a government win, and the expression βXit again 
denotes the other independent variables we controlled for. 
Recall that we theorized that that the Justices would act like 
voters in the pre-1930 era, rewarding the federal government for 
observed economic growth and productivity and punishing 
policymakers for national economic decline. If the “Justices as 
voters” model aptly characterizes the Court’s decisions, then 
economic downturns should cause a decrease in government win rate. 
Accordingly, we expected the Economic Cycle and Industrial 
Production variables to yield positive coefficients (economic 
expansions and high levels of industrial production trend with a high 
level of progovernment outcomes). 
In the 1930s, a period in which the nation experienced a severe 
depression, we expected that the Justices would not attribute 
economic outcomes to policymaking competence but to exogenous 
shocks beyond the control of the economic managers. In this context, 
our theory suggests that the Justices would seek not to punish elected 
officials for economic conditions but to work as a “team” to stimulate 
national recovery. Thus, we expected the Economic Cycle and 
Industrial Production variables to produce negative coefficients 
(economic contractions and lower levels of industrial production 
trend with a high level of progovernment outcomes). 
D. Unobservable and Immeasurable Variables 
Before turning to our empirical results, we would like to 
comment on the possibility of confounding by unobservable and 
immeasurable variables that could affect judicial decisionmaking but 
were necessarily left out of our models. To see the problem, it is 
important to understand that we conceptualized the economic 
conditions as if they were a “treatment” on the Justices. Empiricists 
label this type of study a “natural experiment” or “quasi-experiment” 
because the treatment arguably arose due to an exogenous event 
completely outside the control of the subjects under investigation 
(here the Justices on the Supreme Court).57 In our study, the Justices 
themselves did not cause the economic expansion or contraction and 
 
 57. An example of a natural experiment in another context is the study by Sargent, 
Shepard, and Glantz of the effect of a smoking ban (the treatment) on the incidence of hospital 
admissions for heart attacks in Helena, Montana. Richard P. Sargent, Robert M. Shepard & 
Stanton A. Glantz, Reduced Incidence of Admissions for Myocardial Infarction Associated with 
Public Smoking Ban: Before and After Study, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 977, 977–80 (2004). 
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did not control production in the manufacturing, mining, or utility 
sectors of the economy. Many experts argue that identifying the true 
cause of macroeconomic cycles or production levels is impossible for 
anyone; observers know they shift and change but not what causes the 
observed variation.58 
A natural or quasi-experiment always has a control group, which 
is not affected by the event, and a treatment group, which the 
experimenter believes is affected. The behaviors or outcomes of the 
two groups are compared for purposes of measuring the effects of the 
treatment on the population of interest.59 In our study, for example, 
the cases on the Court’s docket during declining economic periods 
were subject to the recessionary treatment, whereas the cases decided 
in prosperous times comprise the control group. If the government’s 
win rate in the treated cases diverges from that observed for the 
control group, then we have evidence that the economy affects 
judicial decisionmaking. 
The central feature of a classic randomized experiment—the 
existence of a control group to estimate what would have happened in 
the absence of the treatment—underlies the idea of a natural 
experiment, which this study relies on to identify the effects of 
economic conditions. In the natural experiment, just as in a classic 
experiment, the researcher must make use of the differences in 
outcomes between the treatment group and a control group. The 
natural experiment differs from the classic experiment, though, in 
that the treatment status emerges through nature rather than at the 
hand of the scientist.60 The fact that the treatment status in our study 
was not determined by a randomized procedure but by some other 
force raises the possibility that any comparison between our two 
groups of cases will be biased. To determine the credibility of the 
natural experiment—and to ensure unbiased results—it is important 
to examine the characteristics of the cases in both the control and 
treatment groups. Valid causal inferences require that the treatment 
and control groups be identical on all relevant factors. If the two 
groups differ, then it is possible that the observed differences in 
judicial outcomes have nothing to do with the economy and 
 
 58. See ABEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 282–443 (exploring competing explanations for 
emerging economic conditions). 
 59. DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 22–23 (1995). 
 60. Id. 
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everything to do with the type of case litigated in the Court or the 
judicial makeup of the Court.61 
For the purposes of this study, the data suggest that our 
treatment and control groups are similar with respect to three of our 
four independent variables: Government As Appellant, Corporate 
Taxpayer, and War-Related Legislation. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for these variables for the treatment and control groups as 
well as results for statistical comparison tests between the two groups. 
These statistics offer some evidence to support the credibility of this 
natural experiment in assessing the effects of the macroeconomy on 
the Court. It is impossible, however, to identify unobservable factors 
that might impact judicial outcomes such as litigant strategies that 
might shift with economic conditions. If either party pursues cases it 
believes are easier (or harder) to win because of macroeconomic 
factors, then this fact could explain the empirical results obtained, not 
the economy itself. Our empirical results could also be confounded if 
the Justices grant certiorari to different types of cases in recessionary 
periods than in periods of economic prosperity. 
Table 2.  Statistical Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups 
Treatment Group Control Group Variable 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Statistically 
Different 
(Y/N)62 
Pre-1930 
(54 treatment cases and 
112 control cases) 
     
Government is Petitioner .574 .499 .554 .499 N 
Corporate Taxpayer .296 .461 .411 .494 N 
War-related Law .093 .293 .098 .299 N 
1930s 
(209 treatment cases and 
219 control cases) 
     
Government is Petitioner .555 .498 .539 .500 N 
Corporate Taxpayer .359 .481 .361 .481 N 
War-related Law .086 .281 .005 .068 Y63 
 
 61. For a terrific discussion of the empirical dangers associated with natural experiments, 
see Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 
151, 151–61 (1995). 
 62. We report that there is a statistical difference if a t-test between the control and 
treatment groups shows that the mean values for the two groups are different to a statistically 
significant level. 
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For purposes of this Essay, we make the (heroic) assumption that 
we constructed a legitimate natural experiment. In further research, 
however, we plan to investigate whether a selection problem in fact 
exists in the study, potentially raising doubts about the conclusions 
reached here. Indeed, this selection problem may exist in all empirical 
studies of the Supreme Court, but no scholar has systematically 
investigated the problem. Accordingly, we focus on this gap in the 
literature, seeking to fill it not only for this particular study but for all 
future studies of courts.64 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
With this important caveat, we turn to the results of our 
modeling exercise. Overall, we find support for our theory: the 
Justices act like voters in “typical business cycles,” casting 
antigovernment votes in times of economic downturns and 
progovernment votes in periods when the economy is booming. In 
“atypical times,” when the economy moves into a state of crisis, the 
Justices do not adopt the role of a disciplinarian but seek to support 
the government in an effort to help return the economy to a state of 
growth and stability. 
Tables 3 and 4 present our findings.65 Table 3, which presents the 
results for the typical business cycle, shows that, regardless of how we 
specify the model,66 the Justices seem to use the economy as a signal 
for whether to reward or punish the U.S. government. Specifically, 
when the economic cycle is on the uptick (or industrial production is 
relatively high), the government’s win rate increases, as indicated by 
 
 63. The war-law variable for the 1930s period is the only instance of a statistically 
significant difference between our treatment and control groups. This results because, of the 
nineteen cases relating to war laws during the 1930s, all but one of these were heard by the 
Court during treatment periods rather than control periods. As a result, there is a significant 
difference between the value of the war-law variable during the treatment and control periods 
of the 1930s. 
 64. For a preliminary investigation, see Tyler J. VanderWeele & Nancy C. Staudt, Causal 
Diagrams for Empirical Legal Research: Methodology for Identifying Causation, Avoiding 
Bias, and Interpreting Results (Mar. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (explaining how investigators can address selection problems by using causal 
graphs to clarify qualitative modeling assumptions). 
 65. Because we expect the coefficients to have different signs in the two different eras, we 
estimate the models separately to avoid results that simply present the average of the two time 
periods of interest. 
 66. The one exception here is Model 4, in which the coefficient on Industrial Production is 
correctly signed but fails to reach a standard level of statistical significance (p < .05). Its p-value 
is .059. 
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the positive coefficients on the economic variables. Put differently, 
even after controlling for the Court’s composition and various 
features of its selection process, along with other relevant covariates, 
the Justices seem to be responding positively to (their perceptions of) 
competent economic management. And vice versa. 
Table 3.  Results for Pre-1930 Regressions67 
Variable Model 1 
(Outcome) 
Model 2 
(Vote Share) 
Model 3 
(Outcome) 
Model 4 
(Vote Share) 
Economic Cycle 
 
.967*  
(.362) 
 
.163* 
(.076) 
  
Industrial Production    16.541* 
(6.43) 
2.263 
(1.187)  
Fraction Republican 
 
-.255 
(3.717) 
 
-.121 
(.713) 
-3.111 
(7.64) 
-.565 
(1.152) 
Government Side 
 
-.956* 
(.368) 
 
-.220* 
(.072) 
-.773* 
(.398) 
-.186* 
(.081) 
Corporate Taxpayer 
 
.699 
(.369) 
 
.172* 
(.071) 
.999* 
(.436) 
.224* 
(.082) 
War-Related Law -.511 
(.578) 
 
-.159 
(.106) 
-.721 
(.603) 
-.191 
(.115) 
Constant 
 
.332 
(2.800) 
 
.657 
(.541) 
2.944 
(5.88) 
1.067 
(.881) 
N 163 166 135 138 
Log-Likelihood -100.123  -84.144  
Note: In Models 1 and 3, the dependent variable is whether the U.S. government won (=1) 
or lost (=0). We estimated these models using logistic regression, with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. In Models 2 and 4, the dependent variable is the fraction of Justices 
casting a vote in favor of the U.S. government. We estimated these models using ordinary 
least squares regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates a 
p value of less than .05. 
 
 67. The Stata code for generating these results with the data available on the website for 
this paper is as follows: for Model 1: logit outcome cycle PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law 
if year_oral<1930, robust; for Model 2: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec govtside 
corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; for Model 3: logit outcome indpro_pctchg1m 
PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; and for Model 4: regress 
outcome_share indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, 
robust. 
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Moreover, the response is not merely statistically significant but 
also substantial in magnitude. To provide but one example: setting all 
other variables in Model 2 at their mean or mode, when the 
government is the petitioner and Economic Cycle equals 1, over half 
of the sitting Justices can be expected to vote in the government’s 
favor.68 Holding this scenario constant but making Economic Cycle 
equal 0, the government’s expected vote share falls to about one-third 
of the Court.69  
With respect to the 1930s, a period of extended economic crisis, 
we obtained results precisely opposite those we obtained for the pre-
1930 period. As Table 4 shows (and again regardless of how we 
specify the model), as the economy deteriorates even further, the 
government’s expected vote share (and its likelihood of success) 
actually increases.  This result follows from our theory that, during a 
depression-like period, the Justices will side more often with the 
government in times of relative economic contraction in order to help 
fend off the crisis. All else being equal,70 during depression-like 
periods, as economic conditions move from bad to worse, we would 
expect the government’s vote share to equal about three-fourths of 
the sitting Justices.71 
 
 68. .51, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .39, .63. 
 69. .34, with 95 percent confidence interval of .19, .49. The Stata code for generating the 
results of this paragraph using the data available on the website for this paper makes use of S-
Post and is as follows: for the Model 2 regression: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec 
govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral<1930, robust; for the prediction when Economic Cycle is 
0: prvalue, x(cycle=0 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 war_law=0); for the prediction 
when Economic Cycle is 1: prvalue, x(cycle=1 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 
war_law=0). 
 70. We made all else equal by setting all other variables at their mean or mode when the 
government is the appellant and the economic cycle is negative. The Stata code for generating 
the results of this paragraph using the data available on the website for this paper makes use of 
S-Post and is as follows: for the Model 2 regression: regress outcome_share cycle PropRCt_dec 
govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for the prediction 
when Economic Cycle is 0: prvalue, x(cycle=0 PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 
war_law=0); for the prediction when Economic Cycle is 1: prvalue, x(cycle=1 
PropRCt_dec=mean govtside=1 corp_tp=0 war_law=0). 
 71. The point estimate for the vote share is .73, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .65 
to .80. (It decreases to under about .50, with a 95 percent confidence interval of .42 to .58, when 
the economy looks to be recovering.) 
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Table 4.  Results for the 1930s Regressions72 
Variable Model 1 
(outcome) 
Model 2 
(vote share) 
Model 3 
(outcome) 
Model 4 
(vote share) 
Economic Cycle 
 
-1.243*  
(.246) 
 
-.226* 
(.044) 
  
Industrial Production    -7.154* 
(3.496) 
-1.346* 
(.607)  
Fraction Republican 
 
-1.958* 
(.752) 
 
-.191 
(.136) 
-.241  
(.651) 
.115 
(.130) 
Government Side 
 
-.419 
(.223) 
-.096* 
(.041) 
-.350 
(.215) 
-.086* 
(.042) 
Corporate Taxpayer 
 
.247 
(.232) 
 
.027 
(.044) 
.272 
(.226) 
.034 
(.045) 
War-Related Law 1.784 
(1.087) 
 
.180* 
(.070) 
2.093* 
(1.075) 
.231* 
(.069) 
Constant 
 
2.747* 
(.598) 
 
.939* 
(.103) 
.950* 
(.446) 
.625* 
(.088) 
N 428 428 428 428 
Log-Likelihood -249.077  -259.981  
Note: In Models 1 and 3, the dependent variable is whether the U.S. government won (=1) or 
lost (=0). We estimated these models using logistic regression, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. In Models 2 and 4 the dependent variable is the fraction of Justices casting a vote 
in favor of the U.S. government. We estimated these models using ordinary least squares 
regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk indicates a p value of less 
than .05. 
Taking the two eras collectively the comparison is stark, as 
Figure 2 shows. This figure depicts the predicted probability of a win 
 
 72. The Stata code for generating these results with the data available on the paper website 
is as follows: for Model 1: logit outcome cycle PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if 
year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for Model 2: regress outcome_share cycle 
PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 & year_oral<=1940, robust; for 
Model 3: logit outcome indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if 
year_oral>=1930 & year_ oral<=1940, robust; and for Model 4: regress outcome_share 
indpro_pctchg1m PropRCt_dec govtside corp_tp war_law if year_oral>=1930 & 
year_oral<=1940, robust. 
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for the federal government during downturns in the economy for the 
crisis and noncrisis periods in our dataset (with all other variables at 
their modes or means). The government, whether petitioner or 
respondent, was far more likely to prevail during troughs in the Great 
Depression than in downturns occurring in the earlier era. When the 
United States was a petitioner in tax suits prior to 1930 and the 
economy was in a downward spiral, we predicted defeat for the 
United States in seven out of ten disputes. But for the 1930s 
depression era, we predicted a win for the government in seven out of 
ten cases. 
Figure 2.  Predicted Probability that the Government Will Prevail in 
Periods of Economic Decline 
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Note: The predicted probabilities are based on Model 1 in Tables 3 (pre-1930) 
and 4 (1930s) with the economic cycle set at 0 and all other variables set at 
their mean or mode. As the figure indicates, regardless of the government’s 
position, it won quite a bit more often in the 1930s depression era than in the 
pre-1930 cycle. 
 These findings offer preliminary support for our model. They 
also point out that the period was more complex than is suggested by 
much commentary arguing that the Justices regularly decided cases 
against the U.S. government in the 1930s, sparking President 
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Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan.73 In fact, during the 1930s—at least in 
the context of taxation cases—the Justices exhibited a strong and 
unambiguous preference in favor of the federal government, not 
against the government as the conventional wisdom holds.74 
Importantly, our results are not driven by decisions rendered after 
February 1937, when the Court-packing plan was unveiled; we 
reestimated our models using only cases orally argued prior to that 
date and obtained nearly identical results.75 
 Our theory and empirical results not only enhance our 
understanding of the Court and challenge existing literature on 
interbranch dynamics during the 1930s, but they also carry 
implications for the economic crisis emerging in 2008. Much like the 
Depression era, a Republican Court and a Democratic government 
are in place. At least in the area of taxation, it is quite possible that 
 
 73. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 38, at 180 (“It was apparent that the immediate difficulty 
was with the Justices, not the Court . . . . It was only a bare majority of them whose hostility to 
the Administration was so fixed and extreme . . . .”); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT 
COURT 5–6 (1948) (detailing the law struck down by the Supreme Court, and then noting that 
“[t]hese leads from the Supreme Court were promptly followed by the lower federal courts, 
which proceeded to grant during 1935 and 1936 some 1600 injunctions restraining officers of the 
federal government from carrying out acts of Congress”); SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 48 (“As 
though it were impatient for Aramgeddon, the Court in 1936 cast one affront after another into 
the teeth of the New Dealers.”). This is also a view repeated in many constitutional law 
casebooks. See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 93 
(7th ed. 2006)  (“The programs of the New Deal were designed to ameliorate the impact of the 
depression . . . .The early challenges to the philosophy represented by the efforts, produced 
Supreme Court results that were not favorable to the administration.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  129–30 (2005) (“By the mid-1930s, there were enormous pressures for 
a change in the Supreme Court’s narrow approach to defining the scope of Congress’s 
power. . . . [T]he Court also was narrowly interpreting the scope of other Congressional 
powers . . . .”); CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 308 (9th ed. 2009) 
(“Tenacious adherence to an artificial view of the economy . . . ultimately set the Executive and 
the Court on a collision course.”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (16th ed. 2007)  (“The 1935 and 1936 decisions persuaded the 
Roosevelt Administration that strong measures were needed to save the New Deal from judicial 
invalidation. Several major New Deal laws had already been held unconstitutional; 
others . . . might well have met a similar fate.”). Even PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2006), which drops a footnote noting Barry Cushman’s 
Rethinking the New Deal challenge to this “conventional” portrayal of the confrontation 
between Roosevelt, id. at 499 n.1, rehearses the more conventional approach in the text when 
they quote McCloskey, id. at 511 (“[T]he Court waged what is surely the 
most ambitious dragon-fight in its long and checkered history.” (quoting MCCLOSKEY, supra 
note 38, at 110)). 
 74. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 38, at 142–44. 
 75. The coefficients on the variable cycle are positive and statistically significant in our 
reestimated models. The coefficients on industrial production are also positive but do not 
achieve statistical significance. 
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the Roberts Court will join forces with the Obama administration to 
operate as a team to enable economic recovery. Put differently, if the 
Justices perceive the economic conditions of crisis that began in 2008 
as atypically negative, we should expect opinions that defer to rather 
than punish federal policymakers. 
 These are but a few possible implications of our study, but 
“possible” is the operative word given the preliminary nature of our 
work and a number of important limitations. To name just a few: 
 Unobservable and Immeasurable Variables.  As we noted in Part 
II.D, it is entirely possible that the kinds of cases the government 
litigate and the Justices decide to hear differ during peaks and 
troughs in the business cycle. For purposes of this study, we decided 
to put this concern to the side (as do virtually all scholars of the 
Court). Because this was likely a perilous choice, in follow-up 
analyses we intend to make use of methods developed in the 
statistical sciences to deal with the selection problem we confronted 
in this initial study. 
 Variations in the Nature of Cases Between Periods.  The annual 
number of tax cases decided by the Court increased substantially 
from the pre-1930 period to the 1930s period.76 This change could 
reflect a change in the nature of the tax cases being heard. In 
addition, other factors may alter the nature of the tax cases being 
heard over time. Because a change in the nature of the cases could 
affect the probability of the government winning, in follow-up 
analyses we intend to study further whether the nature of the cases 
actually changes, as well as to control for any such changes. 
 The Justices’ Political Preferences.  For this study, we captured 
the Court’s political preferences with a measure keyed to the 
percentage of the Court appointed by a Republican president. 
Although we believe that partisanship is the most relevant factor in 
decisionmaking in the economic context, other formulations are 
possible. Moreover, in light of dominant theories in political science, 
it may be worthwhile to consider measures designed to tap the 
Justices’ ideologies, even if only as a robustness check. 
 The Political Context.  Legal and political models are quite 
prevalent in the social science literature, so are institutional accounts. 
These accounts may differ slightly but their basic idea is the same. 
The core idea is that the Justices, whether to maintain their legitimacy 
 
 76. See supra note 43.  
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or to maximize their policy preferences (that is, to ensure that the 
ultimate state of law reflects, to the extent possible, their preferred 
policies), attend to preferences and likely actions of the elected 
branches. We, in turn, should attend to this account in our model, 
incorporating variables designed to represent the preferences of the 
various political actors. Doing so would also enable us to detect 
whether Republican Courts, for example, defer to Republican but not 
Democratic governments during times of economic crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
 Scholars and commentators have long argued that Supreme 
Court Justices seek to advance legal and political goals in the 
decisionmaking process. But for just as long they have ignored the 
role macroeconomy may play in disputes involving economic 
regulation. We sought to fill this gap by considering the effect of 
variables designed to tap the state of the macroeconomy—Economic 
Cycles and Industrial Production—after controlling for the political 
composition of the Court and various other independent variables 
that may explain outcomes or confound our results. We found 
preliminary support for our model. 
APPENDIX 
 In what follows we supply more information on the measures of 
the macroeconomy we used in our statistical analyses. 
A. Correlation Table.  Figure 3 illustrates the correlation of our 
economic variables of interest. Using data from 1919 to 1940, we 
found the Economic Cycle and Industrial Production variables to 
have a positive correlation of 49 percent. We also calculated the 
correlation between the sign (either plus or minus one) of the 
Industrial Production and Economic Cycle variables, and we obtained 
a value of 54 percent. Finally, we calculated the correlation between 
the Industrial Production variable and its sign to be 76 percent. 
 The fact that the economic cycle variable is binary instead of 
continuous means that care must be taken in interpreting our 
calculated values. Ideally, we would like to have a continuous version 
of the Economic Cycle variable and find its correlation with the 
Industrial Production variable, but because no such continuous 
variable is observed, we cannot undertake such a calculation. We 
instead make our variables more comparable by considering the sign 
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of the Industrial Production variable, a binary quantity. The 
correlation of this new binary variable with the Economic Cycle 
variable is 54 percent. To provide a sense of how this value relates to 
a correlation between continuous variables, we note that, if two 
normally distributed random variables have signs with a correlation 
of 54 percent, then the correlation between the underlying continuous 
variables is actually 75 percent.77 
Figure 3.  Correlation Relationships Among Economic Cycle, 
Industrial Production, and Sign of Industrial Production 
 
 
 77. The formula for the correlation between the signs of two normally distributed random 
variables is ( ) ( )( )tt 11 tan/1tan21 −− −− π , in which cc cct −++ −−+= 11 11 , and c is 
the correlation between the continuous random variables. Substituting c =.75 into this formula 
yields a value of approximately .54. 
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B. The Business Cycle. We used NBER data to determine when 
the country was in a state of recession—the period between a trough 
and peak. Table 5 provides the dates of recessions occurring during 
the period from 1912 to 1945. Figure 4 illustrates the cycle of 
recessions and expansions during this period. 
Table 5.  The Business Cycle 
Date of 
Trough 
Length of Following 
Expansion (Months) 
Date of 
Peak 
Length of Following 
Contraction (Months) 
Jan. 1912 12  Jan. 1913 23  
Dec. 1914 44 (World War I) Aug. 1918 7  
Mar. 1919 10  Jan. 1920 18  
July 1921 22  May 1923 14  
July 1924 27  Oct. 1926 13  
Nov. 1927 21  Aug. 1929 43 (Great Depression Starts) 
Mar. 1933 50  May 1937 13  
June 1938 80  Feb. 1945 8  
Figure 4.  Graphical Depiction of the Business Cycle 
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C. Industrial Production. We used Industrial Production Index 
data from “FRED,” a public database made available by the Federal 
Reserve in St. Louis, as the basis for computing our industrial 
production variable. 78 The index is normalized to have a value of 100 
in 2002, and our Industrial Production variable is calculated as the 
one-month percentage change in the index. 
 Figure 5 shows how the industrial production index varied over 
the time period from 1919 to 1940, and the gray shaded regions 
correspond to periods of economic contraction (i.e., periods in which 
the economic cycle variable is equal to 0). Figure 6 illustrates the 
values of our Industrial Production variable over this same time 
period with empty circles denoting times of economic expansion and 
filled-in circles denoting times of economic contraction. Figure 7 
shows the values of our Industrial Production variable for only those 
months appearing in the set of oral argument dates for our data. 
Points in this plot have areas corresponding to the number of times a 
particular month appeared in our data. 
Figure 5.  Industrial Production 
 
 
 78. The “FRED” database is available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
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Figure 6.  Historic One-Month Changes in Industrial Production 
 
Figure 7.  One-Month Changes in Industrial Production in Sample 
 
 
